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aware of the probable reactions. They were quick to suggest at the
meeting of the Mineral Section of the Louisiana Bar Association
meeting in session immediately after the issuance of the decision in
this case that remedial legislation should be passed. The following
passage from the dissenting opinion is interesting:
"My views accord thoroughly with the following observations
contained in the brief of plaintiff's counsel: 'The only basis
for sustaining these Conservation Orders is that they are fair
and reasonable and do justice and equity to all parties concerned.
Under the defendant's contention, if a lease contained 1000 acres
and only one acre happened to be placed within a unit and no
well was drilled on that particular acre, nevertheless, the entire
1000 acres would be held indefinitely beyond the primary term
but would share in only 1/640 x 1/8, or 1/5120th of the produc-
tion from the unit. Such a result as this makes it obvious that
neither the Legislature nor the Commissioner intended any
such thing.' "24
The court suggested that the lessors might find relief under the
development clause, an expensive and circuitous route to an end
which in the writer's judgment might well have been accomplished




The good faith of the wife in an alleged putative marriage was
at issue in Succession of Chavis.1 Counsel contended the wife had
not been in good faith at the time of the marriage because she knew
of the husband's previous marriage, had only his statement that he
had been divorced, and had failed to investigate the truth or falsity
of this statement. In an extremely well considered opinion, adopted
and quoted by the supreme court, the trial judge declared that the
extent of the obligation to investigate "to ascertain whether there
exists any legal impediment ...will depend upon the facts and
circumstances in each individual case." The relative (and subjective)
quality of good faith is noted and the manner in which a trial judge
24. 81 So. (2d) 10, 17.
*Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 211 La. 818, 29 So. (2d) 860 (1947).
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should evaluate the statements made in prior decisions on the sub-
ject is especially well considered. Following this discussion the
judge found the wife had not simply relied on the husband's state-
ment he had been divorced, but that there were "additional reasons
why the second wife was led to believe no impediment existed to
her marriage with the deceased."
Our jurisprudence does contain statements to the effect that a
wife cannot be considered in good faith if she relies solely on the
word of her husband that he is divorced. A clear cut case of this
kind was presented in Succession of Glover in the court of appeal,2
and in Succession of Thomas' and Succession of Taylor,' decided
by the supreme court. Each of these cases can be distinguished on
their facts, however. In the Taylor case, the wife had been told
shortly before marriage, by the first wife and two close friends, that
the intended husband had not been divorced. In the Thomas case
the court found that the alleged second marriage ceremony had
never taken place. And in the Glover case (which quoted from the
Thomas case), the court disbelieved the wife's actual good faith. In
the case of Evans v. Eureka Grand Lodge,5 decided in the court of
appeal, the obligation of a spouse to ascertain the truth or falsity of
information as to an impediment to the marriage is affirmed; but it
is made clear that the obligation is relative and varies with the nature
and source of the information and the intelligence and education
of the spouse. This, of course, is in accord with the relative or rea-
sonableness test of good faith announced in the famous Marinoni
case, and the Chavis case might be considered in confirmation of
this view.
Separation and Divorce
The separation and divorce cases were routine. Walcup v.
Honish7 affirmed the interpretation of the word "residence" in Act
430 of 1938,' the two year divorce law, to mean "domicile."' Sam-
2. 153 So. 497 (La. App. 1934).
3. 144 La. 25, 80 So. 186 (1918).
4. 39 La. Ann. 823, 2 So. 581 (1887).
5. 149 So. 305 (La. App. 1983).
6. Succession of Marinoni, 183 La. 776, 164 So. 797 (1935).
7. 210 La. 843, 28 So. (2d) 452 (1940).
8. Dart's Stats. (1939) § 2202.
9. See Spratt v. Spratt, 210 La. 370, 27 So. (2d) 154 (1946) and Spring
v. Spring, 210 La. 576, 27 So. (2d) 858 (1946), noted in Symposium, The Work
of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1945-1946 Term (1947) 7 LoUISIANA
LAw RE Viw 219.
[Vol. Vill
1948] WORK OF THE LOUISIANA SUPREME COURT 219
pognaro v. Sampognaro0 and Wojahn v. Soinat" presented only
ordinary issues of fact as to the existence of cruelty and habitual
intemperance alleged in suits for separation from bed and board.
Alimony
Keeney v. Keeney" is a most interesting case. After divorce the
wife remarried. The second marriage was declared a nullity. The
wife then sued her divorced husband for alimony. The majority
opinion denied her alimony on the grounds alimony after divorce
is not due under Article 160 of the Civil Code "in case the wife
should contract a second marriage," interpreting the word "mar-
riage" therein to mean a "marriage ceremony," valid or invalid. The
minority opinion of Justice Hamiter reasons Article 160 properly
interpreted allows alimony to the divorced wife as long as she is
in necessitous circumstances and another husband has not acquired
the obligation to support her.
The minority opinion would seem the more reasonable. Other-
wise, not only is the attempt to contract a second marriage made
penal, but the admitted social purpose of alimony under Article 160
is defeated.
The majority opinion discussed at length the "uncertainty"
which would attach to the former husband's liability if the attempt
at a second marriage would not necessarily terminate the wife's right
to alimony. It may be observed that a similar uncertainty as to the
extent of liability always exists, for the needs of a former wife might
arise or increase considerably at any time after divorce and there is
no prescription of the former wife's claim for alimony.
Williams v. Williams3 again affirmed the practice of using
summary process to fix the amount of unpaid arrearages of alimony14
and reiterated the impossibility of reducing the amount of such ar-
rearages."5 Schneider v. Schneider'" and Russo v. Russo" involved
simply questions of fact, the amount of alimony due in the particular
cases. In the course of the opinion in the latter case the court re-
peated the propriety of adjusting alimony due under Article 160 of
10. 211 La. 105, 29 So. (2d) 581 (1947).
11. 211 La. 562, 80 So. (2d) 431 (1947).
12. 211 La. 585, 80 So. (2d) 549 (1947).
13. 211 La. 939, 31 So. (2d) 170 (1947).
14. This procedure was sanctioned in Snow v. Snow, 188 La. 660, 177 So. 793(1937) and Cotton v. Wright, 198 La. 520, 190 So. 665 (1939), and was admitted
proper in Edwards v. Perrault, 170 La. 1011, 129 So. 619 (1930).
15. Snow v. Snow and Cotton v. Wright, supra note 14.
16. 211 La. 959, 31 So. (2d) 176 (1947).
17. 210 La. 853, 28 So. (2d) 455 (1946).
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the Civil Code at any time to conform to the changing needs of the
wife and ability of the husband to pay. In Weaver v. Burks"s the
wife seeking an increase in alimony payments charged her husband
with discontinuing records of his earnings in order to avoid such
increase. The supreme court considered this move "grave error" on
his part, but concluded from the evidence that the trial judge had
not abused his discretion in denying the increase.
Custody
Ard v. Ard1" simply applied Article 157 of the Civil Code. For
the greater advantage of the child its custody was awarded to the
father, against whom a divorce had been rendered, rather than to the
mother. State ex rel. Eastham v. Traylor" recognized the surviving
parent's right to custody of a child not abandoned or surrendered
to others. Our legislation makes this clear. Under Article 337 of the
Civil Code custody belongs to the tutor and under Article 250 tutor-
ship belongs to the surviving parent. Unless the parent is excluded
or removed from the tutorship for cause, therefore,21 or unless the
parent has abandoned or surrendered the child to others2 2 or ne-
glected it,28 the parent should never be denied custody. The supreme
court did not mention this legislative basis for its action.
Adoption
The effect of an adoption of a minor without consent of its
parents was at issue in Foster v. Richardson24 and State ex rel. Simp-
son v. Salter.5 Parental consent has been required under all acts on
the subject. In the first case, an adoption under Act 31 of 1872,
Justice Fournet was able to maintain the validity of the adoption
by finding the child had once been adjudged delinquent and ne-
glected and removed from parental authority. In the second case, a
then unmarried mother had signed a document purporting to be a
surrender of custody under Act 91 of 1942.2" Shortly thereafter she
sought custody of the child from parties seeking to adopt it. The
court found she had "unwillingly" signed the surrender and that
18. 211 La. 913, 81 So. (2d) 17 (1947).
19. 210 La. 869, 28 So. (2d) 461 (1946).
20. 210 La. 1003, 29 So. (2d) 43 (1946).
21. Arts. 802-305, La. Civil Code of 1870.
22. Art. 213, La. Civil Code of 1870; La. Act 178 of 1910 as amended by
La. Act 427 of 1938 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 4891-4895].
23. As, for instance, under La. Act 169 of 1944 [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1947)
§ 1709.5].
24. 210 La. 922, 28 So. (2d) 610 (1946).
25. 217 La. 918, 81 So. (2d) 163 (La. 1947).
26. Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1947) §§ 4895.1-4895.2.
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this surrender, in addition, had not been made in accordance with
the formalities prescribed by Act 91 of 1942. Accordingly, the child
not having been abandoned, neglected, or legally surrendered, the
mother had not lost her right to its custody.
In the Foster case, the child had been placed in an institution
by order of the court finding it delinquent and neglected and by
this institution placed in the custody of a Mrs. Reese. On Mrs.
Reese's becoming seriously ill the child was left without care and
attention and a Mrs. De Lay charitably cared for it until its adoption.
It was she who signed the act of adoption. On this basis Justice Four-
net reasoned the child was a foundling who, under Article 213 of
the Civil Code, may not be claimed by its parents unless they prove
the child was taken from them by force, fraud, or accident. Judicial
action scarcely can be considered any of these and therefore it seems
the parental right to custody could have been denied on this basis
alone. Whether this denial of the right to custody under Article 213
is the same as the termination of parental right to oppose an adop-
tion might be argued, but this result was reached in the Succession
of Dupre,2 relied upon by Justice Fournet, and it seems that the
result is reasonable.
Tutorship
Article 337 of the Civil Code declares the tutor incapable of
purchasing or leasing the property of the minor and of accepting
the assignment of any right or claim against his ward. Article 343,
however, provides the parent (who is tutor)2" may have the minor's
interest in property held in indivision with the parent adjudicated
to the latter by following specific procedure. In such case the
minor's share in the property remains mortgaged to the minor to
secure payment of the price unless, under Article 344, a special
mortgage is substituted therefor.2" No security need be given by
the purchaser. In Wenk v. Anisman ° the contention was made that
27. 116 La. 1090, 41 So. 324 (1906).
28. Although Article 848 mentions only the word "parent," it is clear from
the section of the code in which the article is found, its context, and its history
that the reference is to the parent tutor or natural tutor. The text contains
references to the under tutor and family meeting, which do not exist except in
tutorship. The legislative origin of Article 343 is undoubtedly Section 2 of Act 21
of 1809, which with some changes became Article 338 of the Civil Code of 1825.
Although this Section 2 reads simply "father or mother," the entire act (Sections
1-8) applies to tutorship matters and by its title is an amendment to the title on
tutorship in the Civil Code of 1808.
29. La. Act 209 of 1932, §§ 1-8 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 4844 4847.4], on the
private sale of property of minors, allows the sale of property held in indivision
with a minor and its purchase "by any co-owner or co-owners thereof."
30. 211 La. 641, 80 So. (2d) 567 (1947).
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Act 209 of 1932 allows the tutor co-owner, as well as any other, to
purchase the minor's interest, thus to that extent modifying Article
337 and rendering Article 343 obsolete. The court decided in the
negative, relying on the general nature of Act 209 of 1932, the
specific nature of Article 343, and on the argument that the history
of Act 209 fairly well leads to the conclusion that its provisions were
never intended as amendments to Article 337 and 343.
The minor in the Wenk case was greatly benefitted by the deci-
sion for, although the sale to the-tutor had been authorized for cash,
the price actually had not been paid and the minor would have been
without a security device to insure such payment. It may perhaps
be suggested, however, that it was not necessary to conclude that as
a matter of law the tutor may not purchase the minor's interest
under Act 209 of 1932. It might be argued that Act 209 of 1932
contemplates cash sales, whereas Article 343 of the Civil Code con-
templates adjudications without the necessity of the parent paying
the price until the termination of the tutorship. Certainly there is
no reason for the mortgage under Article 343 or 344 if the price is
paid by the parent and it seems that in such a case such mortgage
should be subject to cancellation. Whether the tutor receives money
from a third person as a result of a cash sale under Act 209 of 1932
to effect a partition with such third person co-owner, or whether
the tutor is compelled to pay his personal funds to himself in the
capacity of tutor is of little difference. In each case the tutor must
invest the cash in accordance with the requirement of Article 348
of the Civil Code. The important thing, therefore, is to make certain
that the price agreed upon under Act 209 of 1932 is actually paid
by the tutor. It is suggested that under Article 275 of the Civil
Code 1 it could be considered the undertutor's obligation to represent
the minor-and therefore to receive and give receipt for him-in
the case of a private sale under Act 209 of 1932. If this approach
were adopted any tutor, whether parent or not, could be sold the
property of the minor under Act 209 of 1932. Otherwise the pro-
hibition of Article 337 would apply and the tutor other than a
natural tutor could never obtain the minor's interest in property in
which he is co-owner. To effect a partition in such a case the tutor
would be required to sell his own interest to third persons.
31. Art. 275, par. 1, La. Civil Code of 1870:
"It is the duty of the undertutor to act for the minor, whenever the interest
of the minor is in opposition to the interest of the tutor."
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